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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium simulation model of a heterogeneous population in whcih
both consumption/saving and labour/leisure choices are endogenous. We use it to explore
the eﬀects of the diﬀerent state beneﬁt systems on labour supply of old and older workers in
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. We ﬁnd that, in broad terms, diﬀerences in
labour force participation can be accounted for by diﬀerences in beneﬁt structures. The broad
conclusions are not altered when we allow for the eﬀects of poor health at diﬀerent ages. We
ﬁnd that the UK system is preferred by young people while the German arrangement is chosen
by old and older people; the latter are in the majority in our simulated population.
1 Introduction
The aging of populations in industrialised countries and the accompanying trend toward earlier
retirement has motivated recent interest in the determinants of retirement behaviour. Analyses
of retirement behaviour are commonly based upon econometrically estimated models, which serve
to clarify the relations that are exhibited by survey data. Such studies are, however, limited
by the data that are available for estimation, and by the complexity of the retirement decision.
Most econometric studies consequently report estimates for reduced form models, or for structural
models that exclude household savings — neither of which is particularly adequate for inferring the
likely behavioural responses of savings and retirement to policy counterfactuals. The current study
addresses these issues by using a behaviourally consistent model of savings and labour supply to
compare the implications for retirement of alternative transfer systems.
Answers are is sought to the following questions:
∗The Business School, Imperial College London, and NIESR. jsefton@niesr.ac.uk
†NIESR. jvandeven@niesr.ac.uk
‡NIESR. mweale@niesr.ac.uk1. How far can the diﬀerences in retirement behaviour in Denamrk, Germany and the United
Kingdom be accounted for by diﬀerences in the provision of state beneﬁts for old and older
people?
2. Is this likely to be sensitive to the state of health of the population?
3 .W h i c ho ft h et h r e es y s t e m sw o u l dv o t e r sb el i k e l yt os e l e c t ?
As such, the current study contributes to the debate regarding the inﬂuence of pension policy
on the timing of retirement1. Furthermore, the study deﬁnes competing possibilities to existing
government policy, and hence provides a useful platform for comparison and evaluation.2
The countries that are compared by this study have been selected with some care. Most impor-
tantly, Germany, Denmark and the UK span the political typology that is advocated by Esping-
Anderson (1990), which distinguishes between the “liberal” systems that are commonly found in
Anglo Saxon countries — see results for the UK; the social democratic regimes that are typical
of Scandinavian countries — see results for Denmark; and the conservative regimes of continental
Europe — see results for Germany.3 These alternative welfare models involve very diﬀerent value
judgements, and it is consequently of interest to consider their respective implications for retirement
behaviour. The practical relevance of the study is reinforced by the associated discussion regarding
European integration. Furthermore, analysis presented in Work Package 4 suggests that, of the var-
ious European transfer systems that are considered by the AGIR project, the Danish state pension
system is likely to impose the smallest ﬁscal burden on future generations, the German system will
impose the greatest burden, and the UK system falls between the two.4
The principal innovation of the analysis reported here is the use of a structural model of the
labour/leisure and consumption/savings decisions. The advantages of this model for an analysis of
retirement behaviour are revealed by a brief review of the associated literature. Most econometric
studies that have attempted to estimate behavioural responses to pension policy incentives consider
reduced form models. These studies typically focus upon one of three forms of policy variation
1The reverse relation, that demographics aﬀect policy, is not considered here (see, for example, Profeta, 2002, for
recent empirical evidence).
2Smeeding and Gunther (1990).
3In addition, reference has been made to the “subsidiarity” model that is common of southern European countries,
which places emphasis on support from an individual’s extended family. This model is not considered by the current
study.
4It should be noted, however, that pension systems across the EU are characterised by a strong state component
and in only three Member States — Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK — are private sector elements of the
pension systems well developed (Progress report to the Ecoﬁn Council on the impact of ageing population on public
pension systems, Economic Policy Committee Report, October 2000).described by survey data: variation observed at a point in time for a single country due to hetero-
geneity of individual circumstances5; variation observed through time for a single country due to
a policy experiment6; or variation observed at a point in time between the policies of alternative
countries7. Estimates obtained using country speciﬁcd a t ad i ﬀer substantially between studies.8
Nevertheless, the general conclusion of this literature is that there exists a signiﬁcant, though mod-
est, negative relation between public pension policy and the timing of retirement.9 In contrast,
studies that consider cross-country data usually ﬁnd that public pension policy has a substantial
eﬀect on retirement behaviour.10 This diﬀerence can be attributed to the subtlety of the policy vari-
ation that is usually described by country speciﬁc data, and to delays in the behavioural response
to policy change (see Burtless, 2004, pp. 12-13).
A common critique of the reduced form approaches to analysing retirement behaviour is that the
reported estimates are aﬀected by collinearity and omitted variable bias. In the case of studies that
consider cross-sectional data for a single country, the variation of public pensions is often strongly
correlated with other characteristics, such as individual income histories, which may relate to tastes
for retirement. Studies of retirement behaviour that consider time-series data for a single country
are often complicated by the fact that the policy variation described by data is slight, or exhibits
a stable temporal trend. And cross-country studies of retirement behaviour usually suﬀer from
undesirable population heterogeneity, in the form of institutional diﬀerences between countries.
More fundamentally, however, analyses of retirement behaviour that use reduced form models
are susceptible to the Lucas Critique. As noted by Rust (1995, pp. 3082-3083), “Reduced-form
estimation methods can be viewed as uncovering agents’ decision rules or, more generally, the
stochastic process from which the realisations [described by data] were “drawn”, but are generally
independent of any particular behavioral theory.” Hence, although reduced form regression estimates
can provide useful information regarding retirement behaviour given existing pension policy, they
are usually inappropriate for considering the behavioural response to policy counterfactuals. Results
5See, for example, Pellechio (1981), and Gordon and Blinder (1980). Recent research in this vein has focussed
upon the inﬂuence of a retirement Option Value (OV), following the analysis by Stock and Wise (1990). See, for
example, Samwick (1998), Coile and Gruber (2000), Blundell and Emerson (2003), and Chan and Stevens (2004).
6See, for example, Burtless (1986), Anderson et al. (1986), Krueger and Pischke (1992).
7See, for example, Gruber and Wise (1999), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), and Burtless (2004).
8Krueger and Pischke (1992), for example, note that widely diverging conclusions are reached by various reviews
of the literature.
9See, for example, review by Krueger and Meyer (2002), and Mitchell and Fields (1981) for a summary of the
early literature. Blau (1994) is an interesting example of a reduced form analysis, which suggests that both social
security beneﬁts have large eﬀects on labour force transitions, and that changes in beneﬁts over time account for
only a small part of observed variation in labour force participation.
10See, the volume edited by Gruber and Wise (1999) for a prominent example.presented by Lumsdaine et al. (1992) support this conclusion. Lumsdaine et al. (1992) compare
the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power of three models of retirement, using data that
describe a policy experiment. The principal conclusion of this study is that: “the option value and
dynamic programming models are considerably more successful than the less complex probit model
in approximating the rules individuals use to make retirement decisions” Lumsdaine et al. (1990,
p. 31).
In response to the short-comings of reduced-form models for analysing retirement behaviour, a
number of studies have considered structural models of retirement. The most commonly cited of
these include Burtless (1986), Burtless and Moﬃtt (1984), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985, 1986),
Berkovec and Stern (1991), and Rust and Phelan (1997).11 These models are comprised of three
elements: a single period utility function, a discount factor, and a transition probability density. In-
dividuals are assumed to select their chosen action at any time t, from their range of possible options
to maximise their expected discounted value of utility derived over all future periods. Estimation of
the model progresses in three stages. First, the assumed beliefs regarding probable future outcomes
— as embodied by the transition probability density — are estimated from survey data, subject to
the additional assumption of rational expectations. Second, given the expectations estimated in the
ﬁrst stage, the Dynamic Programming problem is solved numerically by backward induction. And
third, a likelihood function is formulated from the numerical solution to the Dynamic Programming
problem, which is used to estimate the unknown discount factor and utility function parameters.12
The general ﬁnding of studies that are based upon econometric estimates of structural models is
that public policy has a strong (negative) eﬀect on labour supply. The structural analysis reported
by Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), for example, suggests that the US retirement peaks at ages 62
and 65 can be motivated entirely by social security, pensions and mandatory retirement. Rust and
Phelan (1997) extend upon the analysis of Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), by adding the incentive
eﬀects of Medicare for an analysis of male retirement behaviour in the US.13 Like Gustman and
Steinmeier, the analytical results reported by Rust and Phelan (1997) capture the retirement peaks
11See also Bingley and Lanot (2004) for Denmark. The model by Stock and Wise (1990), is also structural, but
does not conform to the dynamic programming framework that is the focus here. As noted in Section D of Stock
and Wise (1990), the Option Value model assumes that individuals consider the value of future utility in terms of
the maximum of the expected value of future alternatives, rather than the expectation of the maximum of future
alternatives. This essentially means that an individual fails to take into consideration the fact that they can adapt
their choices to new information obtained in the future when evaluating their expectations regarding the utility value
of future options. Stern (1997) shows that this simpliﬁcation can exhibit poor properties. Nevertheless, Lumsdaine
et al. (1992) suggest that the simpliﬁcation has a minor eﬀe c to nt h ep r e d i c t i v ep o w e ro ft h eO p t i o nV a l u em o d e l .
12See Rust and Phelan (1997) for a detailed discussion.
13The analysis by Rust and Phelan (1997) focuses upon the subpopulation that do not have a private or occupational
pension.described by survey data. In the case of the peak at age 65, however, the results presented by Rust
and Phelan depart from those reported by Gustman and Steinmeier, by suggesting that medical
insurance plays an important role.
The analytical complexity of a structural model is usually purchased at the expense of the
detail that is used to describe population heterogeneity. Perhaps the most important simplifying
assumption that is commonly made is that households consume all of their income immediately,
which omits consideration of the consumption/savings decision. The principal justiﬁcation that
is cited for this omission is the lack of accurate wealth data that are available for estimation.
Furthermore, an appeal can be made to statistical and theoretical evidence that downplays the
role of wealth in the retirement decision (see, for example, Samwick, 1998, and Deaton, 1991).
Nevertheless, such qualiﬁcations may fail to allay concerns regarding the results obtained. Omitting
wealth from the analysis focuses attention upon the foregone opportunities that are associated with
selecting a particular date for retirement. This is one aspect that aﬀects the consumption that an
individual can aﬀord during their retirement. Wealth is clearly another aspect that has a bearing
on the future consumption that an individual can aﬀord.
Denmark Germany
United
Kingdom
DKKmn C =bn £bn
Net Financial Position of Households 492097 2195.50 1742.8
Housing 1504092 3212.55 1007.9
Household Worth 1996189 5408.05 2750.7
Net Financial Position of Country -250014 93.30 -9.2
All Produced Capital 3345637 6537.85 2508.2
National Worth 3095623 6631.15 2499.0
Household Disposable Income 680443 1365.28 720.0
GDP 1360709 2110.40 1043.9
Household Worth/Household Disposable Income 2.93 3.96 3.82
National Worth/GDP 2.28 3.14 2.39
Table 1: Income and Wealth in 2002: Wealth shown at Start of Year
The potential importance of wealth in determining the timing of retirement is reﬂected by a
recent study by Blundell and Emerson (2003). Blundell and Emerson estimate a reduced form
probit model that describes retirement in terms of an individual’s wealth, their age, and their
option value (following Lumsdaine et al., 1990). Importantly, Blundell and Emmerson (2003, p.
12) report that:
In each speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients on these wealth are always strongly signiﬁcant andsuggest that the restrictions underlying the standard option value model need to be
relaxed to allow saving and borrowing against future pension wealth.
These results suggest the intuitive conclusion that an early accumulation of wealth tends to
encourage early retirement. Notably, the coeﬃcient on the OV variable estimated by Blundell
and Emmerson (2003) ceased to be signiﬁcant (at any reasonable conﬁdence interval) following the
addition of wealth to the probit regression.
Rust (1987) was one of the ﬁrst studies to suggest a method for estimating structural models of
retirement that incorporate the consumption/savings decision. Nevertheless, practical applications
have been frustrated by the implied computational burden. For example, one of the most recent
attempts to estimate a structural model of the consumption/saving decision is by Gourinchas and
Parker (2002), who use an optimal consumption model to account for the life-cycle spending pattern
described by the United States’ Consumer Expenditure Survey. Although Gourinchas and Parker
choose the parameters of the utility function to minimise an econometric criterion, they do not
ﬁt their model to the whole cross-section of data. Rather, they optimise for mean consumption
as a function of age, and do not account for diﬀerences of behaviour between consumers of the
same age. Their model does not address the labour/leisure margin and, as far as we are aware,
no researcher to date has suggested a method for making this problem computationally tractable,
given the limitations of current state-of-the-art personal computing technology.
The model considered here is speciﬁed to simulate endogenously the labour/leisure and con-
sumption/savings decisions. Calibration of the model closely follows the existing literature that
considers structural models of retirement. Speciﬁcally, the required transition probability density
is estimated from survey data. The retirement decision is formulated as a dynamic programming
problem, which is solved numerically, by imposing the estimated transition probability density.
However, unlike the method of likelihood estimation that is commonly adopted in the literature,
the discount rate and utility function parameters are manually calibrated to reﬂect broad obser-
vations drawn from survey data regarding consumption, employment status, and wealth. This
side-steps the immense computational burden that is associated with econometric estimation.
Section 2 describes the direct tax and beneﬁts systems of the UK, Denmark, and Germany, with
a particular emphasis on the transfer schemes that target the elderly. The simulation model used
to analyse retirement behaviour is described in Section 3, and the derived analysis is reported in
Section 4. A summary of the study’s ﬁndings and associated implications are drawn together in a
concluding section.2 Three Models of Social Welfare
2.1 An Overview
In 1889, Germany became the ﬁrst country to oﬀer formal state support to individuals during their
retirement. This was motivated by the rise in the political power of the socialist movement, following
the establishment of the kleindeutsch R e i c hi n1 8 7 1 .A sn o t e db yt h eﬁrst German Reich-Chancellor,
Otto von Bismarck, it was believed that “The only means of stopping the Socialist movement in
its present state of confusion is to put into eﬀect those Socialist demands which seem justiﬁed
and which can be realized within the framework of the present order of state and society.”14 The
current German welfare system retains the principal characteristics with which it was endowed by
Bismarck — eligibility to beneﬁts is closely linked to associated contributions. As such, the German
welfare system involves very little intra-generational redistribution, which is why it is referred to as
a“ c o n s e r v a t i v e ”s y s t e m . 15
In contrast, the current UK transfer system is structured to insure individuals against risks
of extreme hardship, as advocated by the Beveridge Report.16 It is consequently characterised by
smaller beneﬁts than the German transfer system, and higher progressivity. The inherent diﬀerences
between the Bismarckian and Beveridgean models of social welfare are reﬂected by the politically
charged commentary of the Times n e w s p a p e r ,w h i c hr e p o r t e di n1 8 8 9t h a t :“ n a t u r a la sf r e ei n d i -
vidual development is to the English in their island home, equally necessary is for Germany a rigid,
centralised, all pervading state control...the German is accustomed to oﬃcial control, oﬃcial delays
and police supervision from the cradle to the grave...whereas...self-help and spontaneous growth
are better suited to Englishmen.”17 The emphasis that is placed on the importance of individual
independence from government intervention is the basis for describing the Beveridge welfare system
as “liberal”.
14Quoted by Zöllner (1982)
15The German pension system provided a subsistence beneﬁt until 1957, after which it was designed as a replace-
ment for wages. The omission of intra-generational redistribution as an objective of the German welfare system is
consistent with Esping-Anderson’s deﬁnition of a conservative regime, which features stratiﬁcation of society along
class lines. Taking into consideration the provisions for child support and home production of the German pension
system, it is possible to argue that wealth is redistributed from men to women. Furthermore, a means tested beneﬁt
has been introduced as part of the pension reforms undertaken after 1992.
16The Beveridge Report of 1942 recommended that the British people should be guaranteed a minimum standard
of living in times of sickness, unemployment and retirement, in return for a weekly contribution during employment.
The value judgements made in the Beveridge Report can, however, be traced to 1536, when English parishes were
ﬁrst authorised to collect money to support the ‘impotent poor’. This embryonic welfare state provided a means of
sustenance to the elderly, inﬁrmed, blind, and mad. See Fraser (1972) on the evolution of the welfare state in Britain
up to 1945. On the contemporary development of the British welfare state, see The Changing Welfare State: Social
Security Spending, Department of Social Security Publication (2000).
17Cited by Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2003).The social democratic model of Denmark takes a somewhat middle-road between the conserva-
tive Bismarckian, and the liberal Beveridgean social welfare systems, in the sense that it adopts the
larger size of the conservative system, coupled with the progressivity of the liberal system. These
two characteristics taken together imply that the Danish welfare system is highly redistributive,
providing generous beneﬁts to individuals at the bottom of the income distribution, and imposing
high tax burdens on those at the top of the distribution. The keystone of the social democratic
model is the political objective of full-employment, which Denmark has failed to achieve since the
mid-1970s.
The complexity of the German, Danish, and UK transfer systems is such that an attempt to
include all of the relevant details here would be a massive undertaking, which — while of potential
interest — lies outside the scope of the current study. Consequently, the country speciﬁcw e l f a r e
systems were divided into ﬁve distinct parts for the simulation analysis that is presented in Section
4. These parts are:
1. the application of tax and beneﬁts policy to employed individuals.
2. the application of tax and beneﬁts policy to individuals not employed between age 20 and 50.
3. the application of tax and beneﬁts policy to individuals not employed between age 51 and 64.
4. the application of tax policy to individuals not employed over age 64.
5. an explicit consideration of state provided pension policies.
As this list indicates, particular care has been taken to simulate the inﬂuence of pension policies,
which reﬂects the current focus on retirement behaviour. Summary tax functions were used to
simulate the ﬁrst four of the parts listed above. These functions are described in the following
subsection. A detailed description of the pension systems considered for analysis is provided in the
three subsequent subsections; one for each country.18
2.2 Country SpeciﬁcT a xF u n c t i o n s
Four functions for each country are used to simulate tax and beneﬁts policy in the UK, Denmark,
and Germany: one for all working individuals, one for individuals who are not employed and aged
18With the notable exception of Germany, the pension system that is current for 2003 has been used as the basis
for the stylised speciﬁcations that are provided below. In response to sustainability concerns, German pension policy
has been the subject of reforms that began in 1992 and remain ongoing.between 20 and 50, one for individuals who are not employed and aged between 51 and 64, and one
for individuals over age 64 and not employed. The functions are speciﬁed at the household level,
and were selected to reﬂect the most pertinent aspects of the respective transfer systems, after
considering various alternatives. Each of the functions used deﬁnes a linear tax schedule, where
both the intercept, and the marginal tax rate are deﬁned with regard to the numbers of adults and
children in the household. A household’s age is deﬁned by the age of the reference person, and
labour status is deﬁned with regard to all household members. Weighted least squares estimates
were obtained for the tax functions using data derived from the ECHP for 2000/01, and these are
displayed in Table 2.19
All currencies are speciﬁed in terms of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), obtained by divid-
ing the national currency by the relevant Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The PPPs used were
calculated by Eurostat, and are provided with the ECHP.
The coeﬃcient estimates reported in Table 2 reﬂect the general properties of the respective
transfer systems. In the case of Denmark, the estimates obtained for the working lifetime (under
age 65) suggest that relatively high beneﬁts are oﬀ-set by high eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t e so ni n c o m e .T h e
UK transfer system by contrast, is characterised by relatively low beneﬁts for households that are
not employed during the working lifetime, and withdrawal rates that are lower than those for the
Danish system. Furthermore, the estimated marginal tax rates imposed on employed households
are lowest for the UK transfer system, which is consistent with the liberal model. Estimates for
the German transfer system suggest that it provides beneﬁts that are slightly higher than the UK
transfer system to households of working age that do not work, and imposes withdrawal rates that
are similar to the UK. The estimates obtained for the impact of taxes during retirement (ages 65
and over) also reﬂect aspects of the respective countries’ pension systems — Danish and UK pensions
are taxed as income, while pensions are exempt for Germany.
It should be noted, however, that the parameter values reported in Table 2 were subject to some
variation as part of the calibration procedure for the analysis that is presented in Section 4. In
the case of the German tax functions, parameters on the dummy variables for age 60 and 61, D60
and D61, were each multiplied by a factor of 1.5, and the parameters for D62 and D63 were set
equal to 4700.00. These adjustments cannot be rejected at the 95 per cent conﬁdence interval, and
are discussed at greater length in the following subsection. Furthermore, analysis based upon the
parameter estimates reported in Table 2 for the Danish transfer system suggested very low labour
participation rates. This is consistent with the particularly generous transfer beneﬁts implied by the
19See Appendix A for details regarding the ECHP.Table 2: Country Speciﬁc Tax Functions - Regression Estimates
UK DE DK
Parameter Est Std Err Est Std Err Est Std Err
Employed
C 510.62* 801.54 2891.27 458.21 341.37* 711.60
NA 7776.90 481.37 5276.08 224.47 7236.42 725.90
NC 2638.40 653.27 1359.81 203.72 5484.94 932.39
(NA+NC)^2 -299.43 96.10 - - -568.57 146.95
X 0.47559 0.02603 0.38565 0.00820 0.38978 0.01137
NA.X -0.03221 0.00885 - - - -
R-square 0.88914 0.86265 0.89045
std error 7001.51 5640.75 4830.84
Not Employed - age 20-50
C 5824.84 1175.63 7303.13 925.59 1060.77* 1780.13
NA 2346.85 812.13 1799.76 740.07 9338.85 1367.85
NC 1726.32 301.77 2039.18 613.00 5407.31 991.49
X 0.34482 0.01463 0.35456 0.02296 0.12222 0.03038
R-square 0.69807 0.81476 0.65272
std error 5957.37 4745.7 6584.99
Not Employed - age 51-64
C 1702.07* 1759.24 2964.14* 1588.85 7624.71 2061.17
NA 6181.22 1186.00 5855.46 926.70 6051.93 1284.53
D60 - - 1457.79* 1298.61 - -
D61 - - 2096.20* 1985.72 - -
D62 - - 5033.60 1925.20 - -
D63 6555.53 2609.23 4417.53 1695.61 - -
D64 5838.84 1708.94 8087.44 2221.16 - -
X 0.53963 0.13877 0.52620 0.08938 0.19804 0.04179
X.D64 - - - - 0.52695 0.25080
R-square 0.63396 0.33669 0.48918
std error 9502.58 10241.5 5683.73
Not Employed - age 65 and over
C 2889.95 905.44 1421.56 642.03 2709.18 1356.44
X 0.77356 0.05893 0.91162 0.03451 0.77948 0.08744
R-square 0.85312 0.90251 0.88143
std error 4216.03 3483.31 4396.76
* denotes insignificant estimate at 95% confidence interval
All currency values defined in terms of Purchasing Power Standards - see ECHP for details
C denotes the regression constant
NA denotes the number of adults in the household
NC denotes the number of children in the household
X denotes household pre-tax income
DXX denotes a dummy variable, taking the value 1 at age XXDanish estimates, and the relatively high tax rates. To mitigate the diﬃculties associated with this
issue, the intercept terms of the tax and beneﬁt functions for individuals not employed, and between
age 20 and 65 were multiplied by a factor of 0.75. Unlike the adjustments made to the German
tax parameters, the adjustment made to the Danish parameters is rejected by an F-test at any
reasonable conﬁdence interval. Nevertheless, the adjustment can be rationalised by assuming that
it reﬂects the impact of measures taken by the Danish government to discourage beneﬁt receipt, or
an associated social stigma. Denmark has created an environment where beneﬁts appear generous,
but are not available indeﬁnitely. The write-down assumed here reﬂects this aspect, which makes
the beneﬁt system “not as good as it looks”. The UK tax and beneﬁt functions are not similarly
altered.
2.3 German Pension System20
Approximately 90 per cent of the German population is covered by “Public Retirement Insurance”
(Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung,G R V ) . 21 This scheme oﬀers generous replacement rates to retirees,
particularly when considered from an international context, and as a consequence very few German
retirees rely upon occupational or personal pensions to a signiﬁcant extent.
Members of GRV are required to contribute 19.5 per cent of their ﬁrst C =5,100 per month (the
Beitragsbemessungsgrenze, or upper earnings threshold, which is approximately twice the average
income) to the scheme. These payments are used to fund current retirees through a Pay-As-You-
Go (PAYGO) framework.22 Contributions entitle members to claim a (fully-annuitised) pension
commencing between the ages of 60 and 65. Under the eligibility conditions that are considered
here, an individual may claim GRV beneﬁts:23
• from age 60, after 15 years of service, and unemployment for three years, subject to an income
test.
• from age 60, after 35 years of service, and loss of at least 50 per cent income capacity, subject
to an income test.
20Much of the discussion presented here is based upon Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003).
21GRV is mandatory for public and private employees, and is optional for the self-employed. Civil servants
(approximately 7 per cent of the population) are covered by a special scheme that is more generous than GRV, and
the remaining 3 per cent of the population is comprised of the self-employed who opt for private pensions.
22Interestingly, German public pension expenditures account for a huge sum - 11.8 per cent of GDP, or C =200 billion
in 2001 - and reserves held under the GRV are only suﬃc i e n tt ol a s ta p p r o x i m a t e l y1 4d a y s .
23These eligibility requirements approximately correspond to 1972 Legislation, which applied until cost cutting
reforms undertaken in 1992.• from age 60 for women, after 15 years of service, 10 of which need to be provided from age 40.
• from age 63, after 35 years of service, subject to an income test.
• from age 65, after 5 years of service.
The period up to age 65 is modelled by the functions described in Subsection 2.2, where four
parameters were adjusted as part of the model calibrations: the dummy variable at age 60, D60,
was adjusted to 2186.69 (1.5 times the estimated coeﬃcient displayed in Table 2, but less than 1
times the associated standard error), D61 was adjusted to 3144.30 (also 1.5 times the estimated
coeﬃcient), and D62 and D63 were both adjusted to 4700.00. These adjustments warrant further
comment.
The coeﬃcient estimates obtained for the dummy variables D60 and D61 are associated with a
high degree of error. This is of little surprise, given that some individuals who are identiﬁed by the
ECHP as not employed at age 60 or 61 are in receipt of GRV beneﬁts as per the above eligibility
tests, while others are not. The adjustment made to the associated parameter estimates reﬂects
the fact that those who retire at age 60 or 61 and obtain GRV receive more substantial government
support than those who are not eligible to rece i v eG R V( a n dw h o s ei n c l u s i o ni nt h eE C H Pd a t a
depresses the estimates obtained for the regression coeﬃcients on D60 and D61). With regard
to D62 and D63, the associated dummy variables were adjusted to take the same value to avoid
misleading variation regarding the inﬂuence on retirement behaviour. There is no particularly good
reason why D63 >D 62, and the parameter estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another
at the 95 per cent conﬁdence interval. Hence they are both adjusted to take the intermediate value
of 4700.00.
Following age 65, pensions are modelled explicitly based upon the regulations of the GRV. The
pension annuity payable upon retirement to individual i at time t by the GRV, Pit, is described
by:24
Pit = RPi.AFi.PVt (1)
where RPi denotes the “Remuneration Points” held by individual i upon retirement, AFi their
relevant “Adjustment Factor”, and PVt the “Pension Value” at time t.
• REMUNERATION POINTS - The RPs accrued by individual i depends upon their con-
tribution assessment basis in each year of their working lifetime t, CABiτ,a n dt h ea v e r a g e
24See and Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003), pg. 13.contribution assessment basis of the population, CABτ:
RPi =
T X
τ=t0
CABiτ
CABτ
(2)
where t0 deﬁnes the ﬁrst year of individual i’s working lifetime, and T deﬁnes the last year
of their working lifetime. An individual with 45 years of average earnings consequently will
have accrued 45 RPs.
• ADJUSTMENT FACTOR - The AFi is considered to vary in relation to the age that re-
tirement is ﬁrst taken.25 AFi takes a value of 1 if an individual applies for a pension at the
relevant age threshold stated above, decreases by 0.003 for each month taken prior to the
designated age, and increases by 0.005 for each month taken after the designated age.
• PENSION VALUE - PV is the crucial link between current wages and pensions. It is consid-
ered to be speciﬁed to ensure that an individual with 45 RPs will obtain a pension with a 70
per cent replacement rate of average earnings:
PVt =
0.7 ∗ average wage
45
(3)
For the simulations CABτ is speciﬁed to ensure that anyone with average earnings receives 1
RP.F u r t h e r m o r e , AFi is assumed to equal 1 for all i. This implies that the pension annuity
considered for the simulations is deﬁned by:
Pit =
T X
τ=t0
min(yit,y max)0.7
45
(4)
where yit denotes the income of individual i in year t,a n dymax is the upper earnings threshold
deﬁned above.
Unemployment insurance has also been used as an early retirement vehicle. The beneﬁti sp a i d
to an unemployed individual if they previously had one full year of employment, and replaces 63
per cent of their last net pay for a period of up to 3 years.
2.4 Danish Pension System26
The current Danish Pension system is comprised of three tiers; the state administered Public Pension
(Folkepension), the Labour Market Supplementary Pension Scheme (Arbejdsmarkedets tillægspen-
25In practice it also varies to account for beneﬁts provided under alternative schemes, including widows’ and
orphans’ pensions.
26Much of the material presented here is based upon Abrahamson and Wehner (2003).sion), and Occupational and Personal Pension schemes. All pensions are treated as labour income
for the purposes of taxation.
• Public Pension: The Public Pension is a universal beneﬁt based upon citizenship and
residency requirements, and is paid from age 65.27 It is ﬁnanced from general taxation revenues
of the current work-force via a PAYGO framework, and beneﬁts are deﬁn e dw i t hr e g a r dt o
the individual. The Public Pension is comprised of two rates:
— The basic rate, or grundbeløb, was equal to DKK 54,204 in 2003. This is subject to a
taper rate of 30 per cent on wages earned by the pensioner in excess of the basic rate
threshold, equal to DKK 230,300 for a single and DKK 159,000 for a couple.
— The Pension Supplement, or pensionstillæg, was equal to DKK 54,564 for a single pen-
sioner, and reduced by 30 per cent of any income earned in excess of DKK 102,000 in
2003. For single earner couples, the Pension Supplement was worth DKK 25,464, and
reduced by 30 per cent for any income earned in excess of DKK 102,000. For dual income
couples, the Pension Supplement was worth DKK 25,464, and subject to a 15 per cent
taper on any income earned in excess of DKK 102,000. If a spouse does not receive a
pension, then 50 per cent of their income is not taken into consideration when calculating
the Pension Supplement.
• Labour Market Supplementary Pension Scheme (ATP): The ATP is a state adminis-
tered deﬁned-contribution pension scheme that is partly funded, and partly PAYGO. Mem-
bership of the ATP is compulsory for all employees aged between 16 and 66 working nine
hours or more per week.28 ATP contributions do not depend on income, but vary with the
extent of the member’s association with the labour market. The normal ATP contribution
(the “A” contribution) was DKK 2,684 in 2003, and is paid by most wage earners, and by
contribution-paying recipients of social beneﬁts.29 ATP contributions are credited to a no-
tional account, which pays a lifetime annuity from age 65. The annuity paid is equal to DKK
100 for every DKK 396 credited to an individual’s notional account. Furthermore, the beneﬁt
27To be eligible, an individual must have been in residence in Denmark for at least three years, and for non-nationals
10 years including the 5 years immediately prior to the pension. The simulations assume that all citizenship and
residence requirements are always satisﬁed.
28It is also compulsory for people who receive daily allowances in case of sickness, birth, adoption or unemployment.
Civil servants are administered under an alternative system. The simulation model does not take into consideration
ATP contributions during periods when an individual chooses not to be employed.
29The simulations assume that all individuals who are employed accrue DKK 2,684 of ATP contributions during
ag i v e ny e a r .c a nb ed e f e r r e df o rap e r i o do fu pt o3y e a r s ,i nr e t u r nf o rw h i c ht h ea n n u i t yw i l li n c r e a s e
by 0.6 per cent for each month of deferral.30 This scheme is supplemented by the Saerlige
Pensionsopsparing,S P ,w h i c hi saD e ﬁned Contribution pension that was introduced in 1999.
Membership of SP is mandatory, and requires all employed individuals to pay a contribution
of 1 per cent of gross income, which entitles them to a 10 year annuity at age 65.31
• Occupational and Personal Pensions: Occupational pensions in Denmark are deﬁned by
individual agreements between social partners. Membership is linked to employment, and is
compulsory. As such, Occupational pensions are essentially designed as a form of collective
insurance. Working members pay contributions as a percentage of their salary (between 8%
and 16%), and generally receive a fully-funded deﬁned-contribution beneﬁt upon retirement.
Individuals can also elect to create their own pension funds, referred to as personal pensions,
which are subject to similar rules and tax conditions as occupational pensions. Private and
Occupational pensions are simulated as a form of discretionary saving.32
The Danish welfare system also includes an early retirement program (Efterlön) for individuals
between the ages of 60 and 64 who have no part-time job or social pension, and who are eligible
for unemployment beneﬁts.33 As in the case of Germany, the Danish early retirement programme
is modelled as part of the tax and beneﬁts function deﬁn e di nS u b s e c t i o n2 . 2f o r5 0t o6 4y e a ro l d s
who are not employed.
2.5 United Kingdom Pension System34
The current UK pension system is comprised of three tiers. The ﬁrst tier consists of the Basic
State Pension, BSP; the second tier of all government run contributory pension beneﬁts (the State
Earnings Related Pension Scheme, SERPS, and the Second State Pension, S2P); and the third tier
of all private pension schemes. Furthermore, Incapacity Beneﬁt is a commonly used vehicle to fund
early retirement.
• Incapacity Beneﬁt: With regard to its use as a vehicle to fund early retirement, Incapac-
ity Beneﬁt is payable to individuals who have paid National Insurance Contributions, and
30Deferrals are not taken into consideration by the simulation model.
31The simulation model applies the same annuity to SP as to ATP, which extends to the full lifetime.
32Bingley and Lanot (2004) report econometric estimates which suggest that Danish occupational pensions have
as m a l le ﬀect on retirement behaviour, relative to the state pension system (although the eﬀect reported for women
is statistically signiﬁcant).
33In principle, an individual must also be a member of an a-kassa for at least 25 of the preceding 30 years, although
there exist some exceptions.
34See A Guide to State Pensions, Department for Work and Pensions, NP46, ISBN 1-84388-094-6, October 2003.have been incapable of work because of sickness or disability for at least 4 days in a row.
Existing legal judgements have assigned a broad interpretation to what deﬁnes an individual
as ‘incapable of work’. The beneﬁtp a y s£ 5 4 . 4 0p e rw e e kf o rt h eﬁrst year, and £72.15 per
week for each succeeding year. Early retirement typically occurs in the UK from age 5035,
and the beneﬁts for not working during this period are consequently modelled separately by
the tax functions reported in Subsection 2.2. Note, however, that two parameters of the UK
tax function for not employed households between 50 and 64 years of age were adjusted as
part of the model calibrations: the estimates displayed in Table 2 for D63 and D64 were
both reduced by two times the associated standard deviations to take into consideration the
practical diﬃculties associated with obtaining the Incapacity Beneﬁt.
• Basic State Pension: The full BSP, equal to £77.45 per week for a single person and £123.80
for a couple (in 2003), is paid to individuals who have been accredited with qualifying years
for approximately 90 per cent of their working lives (between age 16 and State Pensionable
Age, SPA, 60 for women and 65 for men). A qualifying year is deﬁned as one in which an
individual has earned an annual income that exceeds the Lower Earnings Limit, equal to
£4,004, and also includes years of unemployment, or incapacitation. This implies that most
households qualify for the full BSP. For simplicity, the BSP is consequently modelled as a
universal beneﬁt. BSP is funded by PAYGO contributions of current employees. Speciﬁcally,
annual income earned between £4,628 (the Employees’ Earnings Threshold, EET, as at 2003),
and £30,940 (the Upper Earnings Limit, UEL, as at 2003) is subject to National Insurance
Contributions (NICs) of 8.95 per cent to fund the BSP.36
• Second State Pension: Until recent reforms, the beneﬁt payable under the second tier of the
UK pension system was entirely related to an individual’s average earnings over their working
lifetime. Membership to the second tier state pension is compulsory for all employees (but
not the self-employed), unless the employee has contracted out into a private pension scheme.
The second tier system was administered under the SERPS until April 2002, when it became
the S2P. Upon reaching SPA, the wages earned by an individual during each year of their
working life are rescaled by average wage growth, and the average determined. The average
wages earned between £4,004 and £11,200 (in 2003) are multiplied by 0.46, wages between
£11,201 and £25,600 are multiplied by 0.115, and wages between £25,601 and £30,940 are
35See, for example, Blundell et al. (2002) for empirical evidence.
36The total NIC charged is 11%, 2.05% of which is used to fund the National Health Service (NHS). Employers
are also required to pay NICs above the EET, at a rate of 12.8% (of which, 10.9% is used to fund the BSP).multiplied by 0.23.37 The aggregate of these values determine the individual’s annual S2P
beneﬁt. Unlike SERPS, individuals with incomes below the lower earnings threshold (£11,200
p e ry e a ri n2 0 0 3 )e a r nS 2 Pe n t i t l e m e n t sa si ft h e i ri n c o m ew a sa tt h el o w e re a r n i n g st h r e s h o l d .
The S2P is PAYGO, funded through contributions of current workers at a rate of 1.6 per cent
on income earned between the UEL and the EET38. The simulation model is speciﬁed to
reﬂect S2P and not SERPS.
Underlying the BSP and the S2P is the Pension Credit (PC), which guarantees anyone aged
60 or over an income of at least £102.10 per week or £155.80 per week for a couple (including the
BSP). The PC applies a taper rate of 40% on gross private income in excess of the full BSP. The
PC is also subject to an assets test. The ﬁrst £6,000 of assets are ignored, but thereafter an income
is imputed to any savings above this threshold at a rate of 10% a year. The Pension Credit is
modelled as part of the tax function described in Subsection 2.2.
• Private and Occupational Pensions: The third tier of the UK pension system is com-
prised of private pension schemes, of which there are two types: occupational pensions and
personal pensions. Contributions into these schemes are made out of pre-tax income, so that
contributions are eﬀectively subsidised (at the basic tax rate) by the Government. An occupa-
tional pension can usually be classiﬁed as either a ‘deﬁned beneﬁt’ scheme (where the beneﬁts
are earnings related), or as a ‘deﬁned contribution’ scheme (where the beneﬁts are related to
the value of the accumulated contributions). Personal pensions are always run on a deﬁned
contribution basis. Occupational pensions play an important role in the UK pension system
— forming one half of the so-called public-private partnership, they account for approximately
50 per cent of total pension entitlements.39 Private and Occupational pensions are simulated
as a form of discretionary saving.
3 The Simulation Model
A partial equilibrium dynamic microsimulation model is used to explore the inﬂuence of retirement
policy on household savings and retirement decisions. A summary of the model is provided here
— for full details see Sefton and van de Ven (2004). The calibrated parameters assumed for the
simulation model are described in Appendix B.
37For example, if an individual earned the equivalent of £ 40,000 in one year, then they would be credited with £
6,194.02 = 0.46*(11,200-4,004) + 0.115*(25,600-11,201) + 0.23*(30,940-25,601).
38the “contracting-out” rebate on NICs.
39See, for example, Blake and Orszag (1997, table 12).The decision unit in the model is the household. Each household is aged by annual increments,
from 20 to 90 based upon the age of the household’s reference person.40 In every year, the household
decides whether to work full-time or not at all (households are treated as having an aggregate
labour supply)41, and how much to consume given its economic situation, under the constraint
that its net worth must remain positive. A broad deﬁnition is assumed for the economic situation
of a household, which includes the household’s age, its size, the wealth that it has managed to
accumulate, the interest rate, the level of means tested income support available, and the wage that
it can command for its labour. This wage rate evolves stochastically.
The household is forced to retire by state pensionable age, if it has not already chosen to do so.
In retirement the household pays for its consumption out of its savings, or out of income derived
via pensions and investments.
Simulated households are described by 7 characteristics:
1. the number and age of household members.
2. time of death.
3. the human capital of the household.
4. the labour supply of the household.
5. household consumption.
6. household wealth.
7. household (mandatory) Deﬁned Beneﬁt (DB) pension entitlement.
Demographic Size and Composition: The size of each household varies with time to reﬂect the
coupling of individuals, and the birth and aging of children who eventually leave home. Household
size is, however, modelled in a pre-determined fashion, and consequently behavioural eﬀects are not
considered in this dimension. For models of endogenous fertility, see Nerlove et al. (1984), and
Barro and Becker (1989).
Household Mortality: Each household is selected to die, based upon an exogenously deﬁned
survival function. Importantly, households do not know ap r i o r iwhen they will die, they only know
40See The Family Expenditure Survey 2000-2001 User Guide, Vol. 1 for the deﬁnition of a household reference
person.
41An alternative version of the model allows households to work part-time. This option is omitted here to focus
attention upon the issue of retirement.the simulated survival function. This means that the model is able to capture the precautionary
savings that households are likely to accrue in practice to oﬀset the eﬀects of uncertain life ex-
pectancy. The model does not, however, include any endogeneity of the survival probabilities that
might be expected to exist with, for example, household wealth.
Human Capital: A household’s labour income is equal to their human capital multiplied by
their labour supply. The human capital of a household is simulated as a stochastic process using
a regression toward the mean model that adjusts for a learning-by-doing eﬀect. As in the case of
mortality, households are assumed to know the process by which human capital evolves, but are
unable to predict future income perfectly due to its stochastic nature.
Labour Force Status, Consumption, and Wealth: Household decisions regarding labour supply,
consumption and saving are endogenous to the model. As this is a fundamentally important aspect
of the simulation model, a detailed description of the methods involved is provided in the following
subsection.
3.1 Labour Force Status, Consumption, and Wealth
Households choose their labour supply and consumption in every period. These choices are made as
if they are maximising their expected utility subject to a budget constraint. The expected lifetime
utility is described by the additively separable function:
U = E
Ã
70 X
i=t
u
µ
ct
mt
,l t
¶
δ
i−tφi−t,t
!
(5)
where ct ∈ R+ is household consumption, mt ∈ R+ is the household’s adult equivalent size, and
lt ∈ [0,1] is household leisure at time t.42 The parameter δ is the discount factor (which is assumed
to be time independent). From the state pensionable age, tP =6 5 , the household is forced to retire
—t h a ti slt =1for all t ≥ tP.
A Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function is assumed, which is deﬁned by:
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(6)
where γ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and ρ is the elasticity of substitution be-
tween Ct = ct/mt and lt. The higher the value of ρ, the higher the proportional change between
consumption and leisure for a given proportional change in prices. Similarly, the larger the value of
42See, for example, Balcer and Sadka (1986), and Muellbauer and van de Ven (2003) on the use of this form of
adjustment for household size in the utility function.γ, the higher the proportional substitution between consumption today and consumption tomorrow
for a given change in interest rates. Wealth in any period, Wit, is constrained to be non-negative,
and is given by:
Wit+1 = Wit − cit + y
DI
t (Wit,y it,m it) (7)
where yDI
t (Wit,y it,m it) is the disposable post-tax and beneﬁt income obtained by a household of
age t given wealth Wit,p r e - t a xi n c o m eyit, and equivalence size mit. Pre-tax income is obtained
from real returns to investment, RWit, from labour during the working lifetime, hit (1 − lit),a n d
from Deﬁned Beneﬁt pension rights during retirement, Sit:
yit = RWit + hit (1 − lit)+(Sit|t ≥ tP) (8)
4 Analysis of Retirement Behaviour
Simulated data for the UK are compared with associated survey data, before reporting the impact
on retirement behaviour of replacing the UK transfer system with comparable elements of the
contemporary systems that are applied in Germany and Denmark.
4.1 Simulated and Survey Data for the UK
The current analysis focusses upon retirement behaviour with regard to age, wealth and income,
subject to tax and beneﬁts policy for 2003. It is consequently useful to compare the simulated data,
with data that describe the 2003 population cross-section. Unfortunately, the most recent year for
which comprehensive data are currently available is 2000, and hence data for the 2000 population
cross-section are considered here.
The data used are drawn principally from the 7th wave of the ECHP (10th wave of the British
Household Panel Survey, BHPS). This wave of data is particularly useful in the current context
because it provides comprehensive information regarding household wealth in the UK.43 Where
more recent data were available at the time of writing, they have been included for comparison.
It may be argued that cross-sectional data do not describe the actual life experience of any
actual cohort, and that this detracts from the practical relevance of the analysis undertaken. The
implications of the current focus on cross-sectional data are, however, limited by the Markov process
that is assumed for the simulation model. The assumption of a Markov process implies that the
calibrated model embodies three important assumptions. First, that individuals make their decisions
regarding actions at any time t+1, with regard to their observed state in the immediately preceding
43See van de Ven (2004) for details.0
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Figure 1: Labour Participation for the UK — Simulated and Survey Data
period t and expectations regarding their future. Second, that discount rates and utility function
parameters are constant across cohorts. And third, that expectations regarding the future are
formed purely on the basis of current cross-section characteristics. These assumptions warrant
further comment.
The ﬁrst two of the above assumptions are artiﬁces of the framework that is used to simulate
behaviour. Speciﬁcally, the structure of the model implies that heterogeneity of historical experience
is fully characterised by state variables of the model. Furthermore, given the uncertainty that is
associated with demographic trends and income growth, the assumption that expectations are based
upon the current cross-section does not appear inappropriate. The focus on cross-sectional survey
data does, however, imply that care should be exercised when interpreting statistics that aggregate
over the simulated lifetime. Although the simulated proﬁles are behaviourally consistent, they do
not describe the experience of any actual cohort. As such, the simulated proﬁles are better suited
to consider broad eﬀects of policy over the lifetime, rather than the ﬁne detail.
Figure 1 displays average labour participation rates by age, derived from simulated data, and
described by ECHP and OECD data.44 Data reported in the ﬁgure reveal that simulated early
44Data from the ECHP and OECD are adjusted to reﬂect the fact that involuntary unemployment is not included
in the simulations presented here.0
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Figure 2: Human Capital for the UK — Simulated and Survey Data
retirement begins at age 50, and progresses so that approximately one third of the population (32.6
per cent) has departed the workforce by age 60, and 28 per cent are identiﬁed as working by age
63. This trend of departure from the labour force is broadly consistent with both the ECHP and
OECD data displayed in Figure 1.
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the simulation model reﬂects the relationship between household
income and age described by cross-sectional data fairly closely. The observed disparity between the
simulated household take-home pay and the associated survey data over age 64 is attributable to
the fact that households are forced to retire by age 65 in the simulation model, but may continue
to draw upon labour income at higher ages in practice.45
Figure 4 reports simulated household expenditure against expenditure data described by the
2000/01 Family Expenditure Survey (FES). FES survey data were used in response to the fact
that the measures of household expenditure recorded by the ECHP (BHPS) are notoriously poor.
Figure 4 indicates that the humped shaped proﬁle of household expenditure described by survey
data is approximately reﬂected by the simulation model, although expenditure appears to be under-
predicted systematically between ages 38 and 57, and over predicted for ages above 71. This latter
observation can be explained by the fact that simulated households die with certainty by age 90.
Household wealth that is generated by the simulation model is deﬁned to include all ﬁnancial and
45The associated survey data were obtained from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) due to the ﬁner detail
that that survey provides regarding the deﬁnition of household income. See Appendix A for details regarding the
FES.0
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Figure 5: Wealth for the UK — Simulated and Survey Data
housing assets, and accrued rights to the S2P, personal and occupational pensions. The methods
used to impute these data from the ECHP (BHPS) are described in van de Ven (2004). Figure 5
reports the simulated data against the wealth data derived from the ECHP. This ﬁgure suggests
that the simulation model captures the humped shaped proﬁle that can be inferred from survey
data. In the case of wealth, however, the simulations systematically under-predict observations
drawn from survey data for almost all ages, an observation that warrants extended comment.
The wealth comparisons between the simulated and survey data referred to above are, in a
sense, inconsistent with the associated income and expenditure comparisons — if the simulated
income (inﬂow of wealth) and expenditure (outﬂow of wealth) proﬁles with age match survey data
reasonably well throughout the lifetime, then the same should be approximately true for (the stock
of) wealth. It is clear something is missing from the system. Two considerations are of particular
note here. First, the survey data against which the simulation model is compared are drawn from
a single cross-section, and hence do not describe the experience of any one cohort (as discussed
above). And second, the cross-section used for calibration had experienced a particularly high real
rate of return as a result of the stock market boom of the 1980s and 1990s Given that this high
rate of return is unlikely to persist over the longer-run, the simulation model is based upon a more
realistic return of 5%.4.2 Incentive Eﬀects for Retirement Behaviour of Danish and German
Fiscal Policies
The preceding subsection reveals that the simulation model generates a close reﬂection of UK survey
data when the UK tax and beneﬁts system as described in Section 2 is applied. We address the ﬁrst
of our questions, how far retirement behaviour in Denamrk, Germany and the United Kingdom
is aﬀected by the beneﬁt environment by exploring what choices UK households would make if
subject to ﬁrst the Danish and secondly the German transfer system. Given the current focus on
retirement behaviour, discussion of this question begins with associated ﬁgures that display the
impact on labour supply.
Figure 6 displays simulated data regarding labour supply by age for the German and Danish
transfer systems, and associated ECHP and OECD survey data. The top and bottom panels of
the ﬁgure indicate that, despite its obvious simplicity, the model does a reasonable job of capturing
the incidence of early retirement in Germany and Denmark. The reﬂe c t i o no fs u r v e yd a t ab yt h e
simulation model is particularly close for the Danish transfer system, where the simulated timing
of retirement does a surprisingly good job of capturing the ECHP data. In the case of simulations
based upon the German transfer system, the simulation model predicts a slightly longer working
life than exhibited by survey data. This disparity is particularly evident for 58 and 59 year olds,
and may reﬂect a deﬁciency in the methods used to simulate the impact of the German retirement
system.
Figure 7 presents data that are useful for considering the predicted answer of the simulation
model to the question: What would be the eﬀect on the timing of retirement if selected elements of
the UK transfer system were replaced by comparable elements of the contemporary systems that are
a p p l i e di nG e r m a n ya n dD e n m a r k ?T h et o pp a n e lo fF i g u r e7r e po r t st h ep r o po r t i o no ft h es i m u l a t e d
cohort that was identiﬁed as full-time employed, by age and simulated transfer system. The bottom
panel is obtained from the top panel by subtracting the age speciﬁc proportion of the population
identiﬁed as full-time employed under the UK transfer system, from the associated proportions
identiﬁed when subject to the German and Danish transfer systems respectively. The bottom panel
of the ﬁgure consequently highlights the simulated eﬀect on early retirement of exchanging the UK
transfer system with elements of the German and Danish transfer systems. Data are presented here
for the 50 to 65 year age band to focus upon the issue of early retirement.46
Figure 7 indicates that exchanging the UK transfer system with those of Germany and Denmark
46It should be noted that the limited calibrations undertaken for the tax function of the working lifetime mean
that the model fails to capture important labour supply eﬀects at the time of labour-market entry (to age 29 for DK,
and age 38 for DE).0
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Figure 7: Impact on Timing of Retirement of Alternative Transfer Systemsincreased simulated labour supply slightly between ages 50 and 56, and resulted in accelerated
early retirement between ages 60 and 64. These observations are approximately consistent with the
associated ECHP and OECD survey data that are considered above. In the case of OECD data,
for example, the unadjusted activity rate of 45 to 49 year old men and women in 2000 was 85 per
cent for the UK, and slightly higher at 88 per cent for Germany and Denmark. Furthermore, the
participation rate of 50 to 54 year old men and women was substantially lower for the UK (80 per
cent), compared with the same data for Denmark (85 per cent) and Germany (84 per cent). By the
55 to 59 age group, the OECD data indicate that the UK and Germany have similar participation
rates (67 per cent), and Denmark has a substantially higher rate of participation (80 per cent).
However, the UK has the highest participation rate of the three countries for the 60 to 64 year old
age group, taking a value of 39 per cent relative to 35 per cent for Denmark, and 25 per cent for
Germany — the UK has slightly lower labour market participation at the earliest ages of retirement,
but is overtaken by Germany and Denmark at the 60-64 age group.
It is useful to consider how the respective transfer systems aﬀect post-tax income, household
wealth, and expenditure to gain some insight into the labour market eﬀects discussed above. In
this respect, Figure 8 is particularly interesting. The top panel of the ﬁgure indicates that pre-tax
and beneﬁt income simulated under the three alternative policy regimes is very similar, which is a
fundamental aspect of the analytical framework adopted. The bottom panel of Figure 8 suggests
that, compared with the German and Danish transfer systems (which have a very similar impact on
pre-tax income), the UK transfer system imposes a lower average tax burden on working households,
and provides a smaller pension during retirement. These two eﬀects of transfer policy act to
encourage continued labour force participation in old age in the UK as observed. Comparing
take-home pay simulated under the German transfer system with take-home pay simulated under
the Danish system suggests that, although the two transfer systems embody quite diﬀerent value
judgements, they have a similar impact on average post-tax income, and Figure 6 suggests that
they also have a similar eﬀect on the timing of retirement.
An additional implication of the income data displayed in Figure 8 is that the UK transfer system
places a greater emphasis on self provision for retirement than either the German or Danish transfer
systems. The impact that this has upon simulated behaviour is displayed in Figure 9. Figure 9
indicates that households save more under the UK transfer system, than under either the German
or Danish transfer system (between which savings are very similar). This reﬂects the substantial
role played by private and occupation pensions in the UK relative to both Germany and Denmark.
In summary, the simulated behavioural responses to tax and beneﬁt policy imply that exchanging10000
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Figure 9: Household Wealth by Age and Transfer System — Population Average
the UK transfer system with the German or Danish transfer systems would have a weak trend
toward earlier retirement. The most important eﬀect of the policy experiments considered here is
on household savings, which adjust to compensate for the alternative generosity of the respective
pension policies considered. This result serves to underscore the potential importance of including
savings and household wealth in an analysis of retirement behaviour.
The smoothing eﬀect of household savings is underscored by measures of average annual ex-
penditure calculated under the three policy regimes, displayed in Figure 10. This ﬁgure indicates
that the simulated proﬁles of household expenditure are very similar for all three policy regimes,
where the most important diﬀerence is attributable to the simulated wealth constraint. The sim-
ulation procedure adopted implies that households face a less binding wealth constraint following
retirement under the UK transfer system, due to the lower proportion of their savings that are
annuitised. Consequently, households choose to shift some of their consumption from retirement to
their working lifetime under the UK transfer system, relative to the German and Danish transfer
systems. This last observation has potentially important welfare implications.
Speciﬁcally, Figure 10 reveals that the larger pension beneﬁts of the German and Danish transfer
systems, in a sense, force households to save more than they would otherwise choose to, pushing
expenditure into a later part of the simulated lifetime. The justiﬁcation for this government in-
tervention is directly related to the fundamental justiﬁcation of public pension provision. If, for
example, a government is bound by political pressure to ensure that every one of its citizens is able10000
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Figure 10: Household Expenditure by Age and Transfer System — Population Average
to aﬀord some minimum threshold expenditure, then there exists an implicit minimum income guar-
antee. To oﬀ-set the saving disincentives that are associated with a minimum income guarantee47,
the government may elect to force individuals to make suﬃcient provision for their own retirement —
via a public pension system — to prevent them from falling below the assumed threshold. The higher
average beneﬁts provided by the German and Danish pension systems suggest that the ‘political
thresholds’ of those countries are higher than the threshold is in the UK.
4.3 Implications of Alternative Health Proﬁles
Our second question concerned whether deterioration in health was likely to have an impact on these
conclusions. The impact of health on the policy analysis undertaken here is best accommodated by
appropriate recallibration of the equivalence scales that are imposed. However, estimates for the
necessary adjustments are scarce, due to limitations of existing survey data. The most recent paper
that presents estimates for the equivalence scales of health related characteristics in the UK is by
Jones and O’Donnell (1995). They use data taken from the 1986—87 Family Expenditure Survey to
estimate the impact of disability on household costs. Jones and O’Donnell (1995) present a range
of equivalence scale estimates, the most compelling of which (for current purposes) suggests that
physical disability increases household costs by 45 per cent.48 The equivalence scale considered here
47Beneﬁts associated with a minimum income guarantee are assumed to be subject to a 100 per cent taper rate
on any private income earned.
48Based upon Engle curve estimates for consumption of “transport”.0
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is adjusted by Jones and O’Donnell’s point estimate for health costs, as described by:
ai,t = a
∗
i,t (1 + (aH − 1)prt) (9)
where a∗
i,t denotes the McClement’s scale that is considered by the analysis presented in the preceding
subsection, aH =1 .45 is the health related scale estimated by Jones and O’Donnell (1995), and prt
is the proportion of the UK population reported with limiting longstanding illness in 2000.49 These
data are displayed in Figure 11.
We focus here upon the impact of the simulated timing of retirement. Figure 12 displays three
simulated series of employment data for the UK transfer system: one that repeats data reported in
the preceding subsection (Equivalence Scales Omitting Health Eﬀects); one that was simulated with
the health adjusted equivalence scales reported in Figure 11 but leaves all other model parameters
as they were in the preceding subsection (Equivalence Scales with Health Eﬀects); and one that was
simulated using the health adjusted equivalence scales and adjusting an associated utility function
parameter to reﬂect survey data, as is discussed below.
The series reported in Figure 12 reveals that including the eﬀects of age dependent health care
in the analysis, ceteris paribus, induces simulated households to work longer. This is consistent with
the higher costs that households face during retirement to fund a given level of utility. To match the
employment proﬁle described by survey data, it was consequently necessary to increase preferences
49The proportion of the population with limiting longstanding illness in 2000 is based upon age and sex speciﬁc
rates described by ***.0
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Figure 12: Simulated Employment by Age — UK Transfer System
for leisure. This was achieved by increasing the utility parameter α, described by equation (6), from
0.00121 to 0.00130.
Comparing the two panels of Figure 13 with those of Figure 7 reveals that similar proﬁles of
labour exit were simulated with and without taking into consideration the costs of health care.
Both ﬁgures suggest that employment participation between ages 50 and 59 is highest when the
population is subject to the German transfer system, and lowest when subject to the UK transfer
system. Both ﬁgures suggest that between ages 60 and 64 employment participation is highest
when the population is subject to the UK transfer system. These results, as stated previously,
are consistent with employment statistics reported by the OECD for the respective countries, and
suggest that the ﬁndings are not particularly sensitive to the value judgements made with regard
to the equivalence scales assumed.
It is noteworthy that poor health, in all cases, leads to increased employment participation.
This may seem superﬁcially counter-intuitive, but actually the reason is obvious. The prospect of
poor health raises the eﬀective cost of living of people in older age. As a consequence old workers
need to save more for their retirements in order to support a given standard of living. Thus average
participation of old and older workers in the labour force is increased50.
50We have made these calculations using only UK data on health because there is considerable uncertainty about
the international comparability of these data. Thus even if everything else is equal, the impact of reported poor
health in Germany or Denmark on the cost of living is likely to be quite diﬀerent.0
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Figure 13: Impact on Timing of Retirement of Alternative Transfer Systems — Includes the Impact
of Health CostsTable 3: Labour Force Participation Rates with the Three BeneﬁtS y s t e m s
Age Group Transfer System
UK DK DE
Good Health
45-49 1.00 0.99 1.00
50-54 0.94 0.95 0.96
55-59 0.81 0.80 0.85
60-64 0.45 0.33 0.31
Health Adjusted
45-49 1.00 0.98 1.00
50-54 0.91 0.94 0.95
55-59 0.78 0.78 0.85
60-64 0.50 0.42 0.41
5 Macro-economic Implications and Voter Preferences
In this section we explore the eﬀects of the diﬀerent schemes on people’s welfare at diﬀerent points in
their lives. The latter ﬁgures, unlike comparisons of disposable income, take account of discounted
welfare over the whole of the remaining life-span and allow for the fact that people respond to the
tax/beneﬁt environment by varying both labour supply and savings decisions. The implications of
t h el a t t e rc a n n o tb ep r o p e r l yr e ﬂected in models subject to the Lucas critique.
Table 3 summarises the impact of the diﬀerent beneﬁt systems on labour force participation,
with the ﬁgures measured relative to the prime age participation rate in the United Kingdom.
It is plain that the participation rates among old workers are substantially reduced in Denmark
and Germany. The table also shows the impact on participation of poor health, using country-
speciﬁc health data and the equivalence scales of Section 4.3. These show higher labour-force par-
ticipation than does the standard model because poor health eﬀectively raises the cost of achieving
a particular standard of living and thus also the marginal utility associated with any particular
level of consumption. In both cases it is clear, as Figures 1 and 6 already show, that diﬀerences in
labour force participation can largely be explained by diﬀerences in beneﬁt structure.
Both the diﬀerences in the underlying costs of the schemes and the diﬀerences in the participation
rates they induce aﬀect the budgetary implications of the schemes. Table 4 shows the net budgetary
contribution made by people in quinquennial age groups and also the total life-time contribution.
The ﬁgures are calculated for each age group and weighted by the size of the age group in a steady
state population with death rates as implied in oﬃcial life tables. The total contributions are shown
both discounted back to the beginning of working life and without discounting. These ﬁgures areall positive, reﬂecting the fact that only a part of taxation is used to pay for beneﬁts; the surplus
goes to pay for the other services governments provide. The similar net positions in the UK and
Denmark mask the fact that in Denmark both contributions and beneﬁts are higher. The health
adjusted ﬁgures show higher net surpluses because, as the participation ﬁgures implied, the prospect
of poor health in old age stimulates labour force participation among those of working age.
Finally we explore the welfare implications of the diﬀerent schemes. Our model allows us to
identify who gains and who loses with each of the systems in place. Thus we can explore the
preferences of the median voter in each age group and also in the economy as a whole. Table 5
shows the preferences of the median voter. The ﬁgures are calculated for each age of life separately.
Thus within a ﬁve-year age band there are ﬁve median voters and we show the proportions in which
they allocate their votes. The overall votes are calculated by weighting the median vote in each age
by the size of the cohort. Thus they show what the overall outcome would be if the voters were
presented with the choice between the systems.
We can see that the Danish system attracts few votes. Voters prefer the UK system when they
are young and the German system when they are old. The reason for this is quite straightforward.
Young voters favour the low tax rates in the UK while old voters favour the generous beneﬁts
oﬀered by the German system. The switch over point occurs at 45 in the case where voters have
good health. Nevertheless, if we look at the welfare of a voter starting its working life at the age
of twenty, welfare is higher with the UK than with the German system and a benevolent social
planner would therefore adopt the UK rather than the German system. The diﬀerence between the
two choices arises because children under twenty including those not yet born are aﬀected by the
choice of regime. A fortiori they should be expected to prefer the UK system. Their preferences do
not, however, enter into the median voter analysis. These calculations are performed for a stable
population. As the post-war population bulge passes the age of forty-ﬁve, the German system is
likely to become harder and harder to reform and the UK may experience increased pressure to
move towards something similar to the German structure.Table 4: Budgetary Eﬀects of the Three BeneﬁtS y s t e m s
Age Group Transfer System
UK DK DE
Good Health
20-24 364.85 526.76 550.54
25-29 842.13 1004.89 1067.58
30-34 1227.21 1370.52 1463.44
35-39 1400.49 1527.88 1621.08
40-44 1416.14 1561.71 1613.15
45-49 1410.26 1531.39 1591.34
50-54 1236.35 1498.69 1473.95
55-59 913.60 1072.68 1173.86
60-64 72.18 -198.43 -519.61
65-69 -1043.49 -1410.91 -1312.27
70-74 -879.71 -1161.53 -1118.70
75+ -1259.19 -1614.86 -1624.93
All Ages Total 5694.96 5702.96 5973.60
All Ages Discounted 3255.97 3704.92 3880.01
Health Adjusted
20-24 361.64 526.71 547.39
25-29 843.07 1004.80 1067.04
30-34 1234.12 1372.83 1464.89
35-39 1415.27 1535.02 1625.51
40-44 1439.09 1574.88 1620.99
45-49 1441.04 1539.62 1601.70
50-54 1157.74 1474.89 1451.69
55-59 862.02 1018.65 1173.33
60-64 194.74 28.52 -228.73
65-69 -1033.95 -1408.36 -1322.63
70-74 -872.79 -1161.25 -1128.18
75+ -1253.34 -1616.91 -1639.84
All Ages Total 5782.81 5883.55 6227.32
All Ages Discounted 3271.74 3732.54 3914.79Table 5: Median Voter Preferences
Age Group Transfer System
UK DK DE
Good Health
20-24 100 0 0
25-29 100 0 0
30-34 100 0 0
35-39 100 0 0
40-44 100 0 0
45-49 0 0 100
50-54 0 0 100
55-59 0 0 100
60-64 0 0 100
65-69 0 0 100
70-74 0 0 100
75+ 0 0 100
All Ages 44 0 54
Welfare 20yo 411 406 403
Health Adjusted
20-24 100 0 0
25-29 100 0 0
30-34 100 0 0
35-39 100 0 0
40-44 100 0 0
45-49 10 0 90
50-54 0 0 100
55-59 0 0 100
60-64 0 0 100
65-69 0 0 100
70-74 0 0 100
75+ 0 0 100
All Ages 46 0 54
Welfare 20yo 374 370 3686C o n c l u s i o n s
We ﬁnd that in broad terms diﬀerences in labour force participation by people in the years leading
up to retirement can be accounted for by diﬀerences in the beneﬁts y s t e m si np l a c ei nD e n m a r k ,
Germany and the United Kingdom. However, taking beneﬁts in Denamrk at their face value and
without exploring the other aspects of the beneﬁt system we ﬁnd that incentives to work are week
for people of all ages. We make the assumption that beneﬁts availble to people of working age in
Denmark are worth only 75% of their true value; in fact the high labour supply is probably achieved
by a combination of a strong work ethic and a policy of limiting the duration of some beneﬁts and
encouraging people to work in other ways.
The assumption that people’s welfare is aﬀected by their state of health has the eﬀect of raising
the cost of living in old age- at least on a probabilistic basis. This in turn raises labour force
participation among people close to retirement because the expenses associated with achieving any
particular living standard after retirement are increased. However in broad terms conclusions about
the relative eﬀects of the diﬀerent welfare schemes are not aﬀected.
We ﬁnd that the tax/transfer system is cheapest in the UK (seen in terms of net payment to the
government discounted to the start of working life) and most expensive in Germany. However this,
of course, reﬂects the fact that it is not possible to distinguish betweend iﬀerent forms of taxation.
The higher tax burden means that young voters prefer the UK system to the German system.
However voters over forty-ﬁve typically prefer the German system and the degree of longeivty is
such that, even for a steady-state population, such voters will be in the majority. This draws
attention to obvious political problems which countries with generous pension systems may ﬁnd
diﬃcult to address.
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A.1 European Community Household Panel
The European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) is “the most closely co-ordinated
component of the European system of social surveys” that are collected by Eurostat (the statistical
oﬃce of the European Communities). The ECHP provides detailed panel data for households that
are drawn from 15 European Community counties, spanning the period between 1994 and 2000
(the most recent year for which data have been made available). The data are collected at annual
intervals, and so build up an historical record of 60,500 nationally representative households.51
The ECHP data that are considered in this paper, have been sourced by Eurostat from the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the UK, from the Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP)
for Germany, and from a National Data Collection Unit commissioned by Eurostat for Denmark.
The BHPS is a panel survey of households that were originally selected to provide a nationally
representative sample of the UK population.52 The ﬁrst wave of the survey was undertaken in 1990,
and includes information for 13,840 individuals drawn from 5,511 households. Subsequent waves
have been undertaken annually, to provide a survey history for individuals who were approached in
the original wave (and their subsequent households). The most recent wave released by the Oﬃce for
National Statistics (ONS) supplies data for the year 2000/01 (the tenth consecutive wave), and is of
particular interest because it includes a suite of questions that are designed speciﬁcally to describe
household wealth. When combined with the time-series aspect of the survey, these questions provide
av a l u a b l es o u r c eo fw e a l t hd a t af o rt h eU K . 53
The German Socio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP) is a representative longitudinal study of private
households in Germany. The survey commenced in 1984, and records data collected at annual
intervals for an initial sample of private households. The survey was extended in 1990 to include
the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).
The variables used to undertake the analysis presented in this paper were extracted from the
ECHP using SPSS programs. The authors may be contacted for further details.
51See Eurostat (2003) for further details regarding the ECHP.
52Due to the repeated survey methods employed, the most recent wave of the BHPS no longer provides a repre-
sentative sample of the UK population. See Taylor (2001) for further details regarding the BHPS.
53There are currently three main sources of wealth data for the UK; the General Household Survey (primarily
for housing wealth), the Family Resources Survey, and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). An alternative
source that will provide detailed information for the English population over the age of 50 is the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing, the ﬁrst wave of which has yet to be released. Following a review of these alternative data sets, the
BHPS was identiﬁed as the most comprehensive source of wealth data currently available for the UK.A.2 Family Expenditure Survey
The FES is a cross-sectional survey that provides a detailed description of household expenditure,
income and demographic characteristics. The model calibrations are based upon expenditure data
derived from the 2000/01 FES, which records information for a nationally representative sample of
6,115 households that were randomly selected from the Small Users ﬁle of the Post Oﬃce’s list of
addresses.54 Expenditure data are obtained for the FES from a diary that is kept by each responding
adult during a two week period. Data on some expenditures are based on individual recall or the
most recent bill.
B Parameters Used for Simulations
Human Capital
The model used to generate human capital, as discussed at length by Sefton and van de Ven (2004),
is deﬁned by:
hit = β
Rhit−R +
R X
s=1
β
s−1 (θwit−s + f (t +1− s)+εit+1−s) (10)
where hit is (log) full-time annual wage the household i at age t, wit is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the reference person of household i is full-time employed at age t and zero
otherwise, and f (.) is a cubic polynomial of age.
Equation (10) was estimated using a sample selection model of individual full-time employment
wages.55 This model takes into consideration the fact that wages are only observed for individuals
who are working, and that there is likely to be a relationship between the probability of working
and the wage rate.
The sample selection model involves estimating two equations, a probit to identify individuals
who are employed, and a (log) wage equation. The probit equation used predicts the probability
of an individual’s employment status with regard to various demographic, health, and economic
variables. Estimates for a probit model that was arrived at after trialling various alternatives are
reported in Table 6. Two sets of regression estimates for equation (10) are reported in Table 7, one
in which R =3 , and another in which R =6 . Both of these regressions use observations drawn
54For further information, see Family Expenditure Survey 2000-2001 User Guide. London: Oﬃce for National
Statistics.
55The regression was undertaken using the “Sampsel” procedure in TSP, full details of which can be obtained from
the “TSP 4.4 User’s Guide” (see http://elsa.berkeley.edu/wp/tsp_user/tspugpdf.htm).1
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Figure 14: Household Size by Age of Reference Person0
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from the ECHP for 2000/01 to describe hit for household reference people. Table 7 also includes
“restricted estimates”, which are used for the simulation analysis. The relationship between the
various regression models for which estimates are reported in Table 7 is discussed at length by Sefton
and van de Ven (2004).56 T h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ei n c o m ep r o ﬁle implied by the restricted
estimates reported in Table 7, and the ECHP survey data is displayed in Figure 16.
Table 6: Probit Regression of Full-Time Employment
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
C -12.17570 (3.47E+00)
AGE 0.99082 (3.48E-01)
AGE2 -0.03158 (1.26E-02)
AGE3 4.60E-04 (1.95E-04)
AGE4 -2.69E-06 (1.10E-06)
NC -0.33892 (3.24E-02)
MALE 1.01702 (5.81E-02)
COUPLE 0.03831 (6.83E-02)
CAR 0.48719 (8.45E-02)
ROOMST 0.03914 (1.87E-02)
H45TTM3 -1.43907 (2.28E-01)
H12TTM3 0.23211 (5.72E-02)
correct predictions 0.78782
56All currencies are speciﬁed in terms of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), obtained by dividing the national
currency by the relevant Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The PPPs used were calculated by Eurostat, and are
provided with the ECHP.Table 7: Econometric Estimates of Human Capital Equation
R=3 R=6 restricted ests.
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
beta 0.829272 8.36E-03 0.881672 6.49E-03 0.975000 NA
theta 0.080523 3.40E-02 0.108149 2.21E-02 0.056670 2.08E-02
c 1.548770 1.80E-01 1.062290 1.19E-01 0.631478 9.72E-02
age 1.96E-02 1.33E-02 5.16E-03 9.04E-03 -2.44E-02 7.49E-03
age^2 -5.41E-04 3.26E-04 -2.26E-04 2.24E-04 4.64E-04 1.88E-04
age^3 4.42E-06 2.59E-06 2.30E-06 1.80E-06 -2.91E-06 1.53E-06
inverse mills -0.143250 2.99E-02 -0.157948 3.75E-02 -0.028813 4.21E-02
R-squared 0.509533 0.383955 0.362528
stnd error 0.333069 0.37255 0.424956
adj stnd error 0.154155 0.106433 0.148882
The geometric mean assumed for human capital at age 20 is 13,091.88 (PPS) and standard
deviation is 0.40, both of which are derived from ECHP data. The standard deviation of the
temporal variation term εit, is assumed to equal 0.1489, which was calculated from the econometric
estimate for the standard deviation of the restricted regression reported in Table 7.5000
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Figure 16: Estimates of Human Capital by Age 
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